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My thesis will focus on the regulation of international trade and the impact free trade has on 
the welfare of individuals, nation-states, regional bodies and the overall global welfare. The role 
and capacity of intergovernmental organizations, in particular the United Nations (UNCTAD and 
ECLA), International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, will be analyzed mainly 
using the policy documents of these IGO as well as their real capabilities in the international 
trade arena. Moreover, the role of nation-states, as arguably the most important regulators of 
trade, will also be a key topic through-out the thesis. The loss of sovereignty when entering a 
regional trading bloc can often differ based on the relative economic and political power of the 
given nation-state. This can pose a major threat to the stability of international trade. The thesis 
should be interesting both for academic scholars as well as the average reader because the topic is 
relevant to our every-day life and our every-day choices. As individuals living in a capitalist 
society, we frequently interact as customers (buying goods) or vendors (selling goods) and 
therefore we are key actors in the regulation of international trade. However, our decisions in the 
market arena are mostly determined by a self-interested and rational cost-benefit analysis. 
Regulation of International Trade: The Struggle of Multilateralism in the Era of 
Regionalism 
 
While the theoretical background of international trade will not be neglected in order to 
provide the reader with sufficient background knowledge, the main focus will be on the current 
issues of international trade; the widening gap between world’s richest and poorest citizens, 
exploitation of developing countries natural resources and cheap labor force. A crucial part of the 
thesis will be identifying the advantages and disadvantages of regional trading blocs and 
analyzing whether such trading blocs are an example of protectionist policies or whether they are 
a natural occurrence in the world of trade and commerce. In order to portray the benefits and cons 
of regional trading blocs opposed to absolute free trade through multilateralism, various 
quantitative indicators will be analyzed. Examples of such indicators are the Bertellsman 
Stiftung, UN Human Development Index, OECD sustainable governance indicators or World 
Bank indicators. Moreover, it will be critical to distinguish regional trading blocs which promote 




1. Hypothesis #1: Free trade has a positive impact on the economic welfare of both 
developed and developing countries. 
2. Hypothesis #2: Regional trading blocs are a form of protectionist policies and therefore 
put states outside of the region at a disadvantage. 
3. Hypothesis #3: Regional trading blocs consisting of developed and developing countries 




In order to prove or disprove my hypothesis, I will be using both the qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies. My qualitative methodology will provide the reader with an understanding of the 
values, ideas and experiences surrounding the key topics of the thesis. The quantitative 
methodology, on the other hand, will provide statistical data regarding the well-being of both 
developed and developing nation-states upon the entry in bilateral, regional or multilateral trade 
agreements. Overall, the methodology used in this research will be mostly empirical, as I will be 
 





II. Theoretical background 
a. Adam Smith and David Ricardo 
i. Absolute advantage/specialization 
ii. Comparative advantage 
b. Mercantilism 
c. Laissez-faire 









c. Civic sector 







f. International law – but who enforces it? 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
“The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order 
[those who live by profit] ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to 
be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, 
but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men whose interest is never 
exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to 
oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and 
oppressed it.”1Even though humans have been trading goods, ideas and services for thousands of 
years, regulation of international trade is a concept still in its developing stages. The regulation of 
international trade is a complex issue because in today’s globalized world, it demands a balance 
between policies of domestic governments and bilateral and multilateral agreements. Arguably, 
the most significant actors are national governments who often cooperate together by entering 
into bilateral, regional or multilateral agreements, providing favourable conditions for the trade of 
commodities between private actors seeking to improve their economic well-being. Furthermore, 
politicians of national governments create policies, which must be respected by private actors 
taking part in trade. Most trade activities occur between private economic actors, such as firms or 
corporations, rather than between nation-states directly and fall under the jurisdiction of domestic 
law of the importing and exporting countries and their respective agreements. However, there are 
many trade activities where governments allocate particular projects to firms (e.g. the 
construction of a highway), which have been subject to investigation due to the possibility of 
corruption taking place. Even though corruption is a great problem for many nation-states, it will 
                                                  
1Adam Smith,1776 
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not be the main focus of this research. The main focus will be on preferential trade agreements 
between nation-states which provide the members of the agreements with favourable trading 
conditions. National governments enter into bilateral (with one other nation-state), regional 
(based on a region or preferential partnership) or multilateral (with multiple nation-states) 
agreements. While multilateral agreements or international conventions involve a large amount of 
nation-states and strive to create identical trade conditions for all member-states, bilateral and 
regional agreements have been the subject of many discussions due to their possible 
discriminatory aspect. Such discussions usually take place in intergovernmental organizations 
such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund or the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. An important part of this research will include 
interviews with a representative of the World Trade Organization. 
    Many economic models, using various assumptions, state that free trade (due to the theory of 
comparative advantage) will make countries better off. Unfortunately, such theories do not 
always represent reality which has led to many economists questioning the free trade theory and 
to the increase of fair trade movements. Moreover, the increasing amount of preferential trade 
agreements has led many people to become sceptical about neoliberal policies and free trade. The 
main issues of today’s state of international trade are poverty and malnutrition in many of the 
world‘s underdeveloped regions, the growing gap between the rich and poor, environmental 
protection and immigration. “The problems of poverty, inequality, and incomplete risk and 
capital markets lead the experience of these countries to diverge from the predictions of the 
simple neo-classical models.”2 These issues require further policy adjustments and stricter 
enforcement in areas, where evil traits such as greed may lead to a deficiency in human rights or 
                                                  
2Stiglitz, 2005, p.6 
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even violent tensions. Examples of Sierra Leone’s diamonds or Sudan’s oil show how groups of 
people can take part in warfare because of natural resources. Often resulting in the deaths of 
thousands of innocent citizens, including women and children, such warfare must be prevented at 
any cost. However, this can only occur if states and multi-national corporations, regardless of 
their economic and political power, take into account concepts related to fairness, equality and 
welfare of the global community. While many rules are widely accepted and declared in 
conventions, in many other cases nation-states must rely on reciprocity because international law 
is, to a large extent, difficult to enforce. This is mostly caused by nation-states not willing to 
sacrifice their national sovereignty to intergovernmental organizations. Reciprocity is the concept 
of quid-pro-quo behaviour by nation-states where nation-states reward other nation-states’ kind 
behaviour by kind behaviour. In other words, national governments are aware that if they provide 
their neighbour with favourable trading conditions, the neighbour will most likely do so in return. 
Furthermore, multi-national corporations have taken a dominant position in today‘s globalized 
international trade arena. Even though these issues will be analyzed deeper in latter chapters, the 
main focus will be on preferential trade agreements and regional organizations.  
    “Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) comprise a variety of arrangements that favor member 
parties over non-members by extending tariff and other non-tariff preferences.” 3Based on this 
statement, one can easily deduce that PTAs put non-member states and their local producers at a 
disadvantage. In a perfectly free market, the supply and demand forces would select the 
producers, which provide a quality product at the most competitive price. In contrast, PTAs alter 
this natural selection by putting some producers at an advantage and consequently putting some 
producers at a disadvantage. Whether preferential trade agreements are a form of protectionist 
                                                  
3Ahearn, 2010, p.2 
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policies or a natural by-product of today’s globalized and interconnected environment will be a 
key question in latter sections. Nevertheless, the amount of PTAs has been rapidly increasing and 
one has to assume that PTAs will remain a key component in international trade in the years to 
come. Baldwin states, “This means that the only way to move from fragmentation to coherence 
when it comes to RTAs is for the WTO to work with regionalism, and not against it.”4 
While individual prosperity drives the forces of the free market and is therefore vital to 
international trade, basic human principles based on abstract terms such as empathy, dignity and 
peace should not be ignored. However, one can argue that the opposite can be witnessed. The 
positive element of the right for prosperity has perhaps grown out of proportion and in many 
cases has been taken over by greed and a constant fight for financial power. This has led to a 
growing gap between the world’s richest and the world’s poorest. Moreover, principles of peace 
are in some cases ignored when war may actually benefit the main actors involved. Our tolerance 
of this phenomenon is portrayed by not only the leniency of politicians and the growing power of 
MNCs, but more importantly by the lack of our participation in protests, demonstrations or 
strikes. 
    In today’s time, nation-states’ governments find each other situated in a ‘gray’ zone because 
often their political objectives and goals laid out in various international conventions may be 
overpowered by expectations of achieving high levels of growth. Therefore, the involvement of 
non-governmental organizations, as well as the media, will be vital to raising people’s awareness 
of the negative side-effects of this ‘race to the top’. Whether international trade will take a 
positive turn in decades to come will depend equally on the approach of the most powerful 
nation-states and the regional and intergovernmental organizations to which they adhere, on the 
                                                  
4 The Prospects of International Trade Regulation, 2011. p. 138 
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attitude of multinational corporations, on the influence of the media and on consumer choice. 
Nevertheless, raising awareness and debating the unpleasant issues relevant to trade is the first 
step towards a world, in which trade, an activity dating back thousands of years, can be carried 
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Chapter II: Historical Overview 
   
 “The heroes laid down their arms and set about trading to become wealthy.”5 Trade of 
goods dates back thousands of years and has gone through many phases where various theories 
were the bases for rules, methods and practices of international trade. Trebilcock states, “Trade 
regulation through the imposition of tolls (a major source of state revenue) has almost as long a 
history, as do trade agreements between nation-states – a commercial treaty between the Kings of 
Egypt and Babylonia existed in 2500 BC.”6 While trade has been occurring for a long period of 
time, many of the most influential theories did not come into play until a few centuries ago. 
Mercantilism, an influential economic theory of the 17th century, was based on the principle that 
nation-states should improve their own economic condition through trade, but this improvement 
would come at the expense of other countries. Mercantilism shows us early traits of government 
interference because it encourages nation-states to protect their precious metals and claims that 
trade should only occur when it is favourable for a nation. However, mercantilism became 
subject to criticism by promoters of laissez-faire in the 18th century, where government 
intervention was deemed as contrary to beneficial trade conditions. The decline of mercantilism 
led to the rise of liberalism and even though there were periods of criticism to the liberalist model 
of free trade, it remains one of the prevailing models of our times.  
    “The notion that free trade - free trade, unencumbered by government restrictions - is welfare-
enhancing is one of the most fundamental doctrines in modern economics, dating back at least to 
                                                  
5LaLouette, 1985, p.118 
6Trebilcock, 2005, p.17 
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Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1816).”7 Following the liberal breakthroughs of 
economists of the likes of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, European economies started 
cooperating more intensively in the 18th and 19th centuries. “This process included the repeal of 
laws banning the export of certain materials previously considered essential to national welfare, 
the abolition of local regulations regarding manufacturing techniques, the adoption of (national) 
standards in weights and measures, and the end of restrictions on personal economic freedom 
(continuing bans against unions being a conspicuous exception to the general trend).”8 Despite a 
mild return to protectionism towards the end of the 19th century, the world experienced a long 
era of trade. World War I brought an end to this time of great economic prosperity in the western 
world, and many states returned to protectionist policies even after the war ended.  
    After the world wars, the 20th century became greatly influential in shaping the world of 
international trade because nation-states were involved in a series of negotiations, ranging from 
the GATT agreement to today’s negotiations between regional blocs, for example between 
member states of the European Union. This series of negotiations led to the inevitable creation of 
various principles and rules, which govern the arena of international trade up until today. 
Moreover, it is important to note that the World Trade Organization, the intergovernmental 
organization responsible for setting suitable trading conditions and overlooking today’s world of 
commerce, replaced the GATT in the 1990s. However, the WTO, due to its’ lack of involvement 
in tackling issues associated with international trade, has become subject to criticisms by 
advocates of fair trade, a topic which will be discussed in latter sections. Moreover, regionalism 
has become a leading force in the international trade arena as countries are constantly looking to 
                                                  
7Stiglitz, 2005, p.12 
8Trebilcock, 2005, p.17 
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agree to favourable trading conditions with potential trading partners. WTO Trade Report 2011 
confirms, “the establishment of the post-war multilateral trading system did not diminish the 
attraction of bilateral or regional approaches to trade arrangements and led instead to a period of  
creative interaction and sometimes tension between multilateralism and regionalism.9” 
    The Washington Consensus played an influential role in international trade in the 80s and 90s 
and represented a shift towards neo-liberal policies. Responsibility was shifted from the state to 
the individual and the classic pay-as-you-go non-profit system based on the Bismarckian model 
was switched to a private profit-oriented system. The Washington Consensus faded away in the 
first decade of the new millennium and recently the G20 countries have agreed to a new set of 
principles and guidelines for international trade. These principles and guidelines are set forth in 
the Seoul Development Consensus and encourage developed states to trade with low income 
countries in order to achieve global economic growth. Moreover, after the failure of the WTO 
talks in Seattle in 1999 and the consequent protests, the WTO met again in Doha, Qatar in 2001 
in order to focus on the growth and development of the world’s least developed countries. While 
it is important that more and more focus is put on the world’s least developed countries and large 
sums of financial aid are being provided to areas of need, the growing inequality between the 
world‘s richest and poorest people and the amount of men, women and children suffering from 
malnutrition and poverty continues to put doubt in the minds of many scholars, economists and 
consumers alike. The failures of the Doha Development Round will be analyzed in latter sections. 
Even though trade has been occurring between developed and underdeveloped states, one could 
question whether it is driven by evil traits or traits of good. Whether international trade is driven 
                                                  
9 World Trade Report 2011, p. 5 
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by greed and purely personal economic interest or whether it is driven by global coexistence, 
fairness and peace, is up for debate. 
A ‘preferential trade agreement’ is an agreement between two or more nation-states and 
provides beneficial trading conditions for the participants of the agreement, in most cases by 
reducing tariffs or providing other favourable conditions for the participants of the agreement. 
PTAs have been used since the times of empires and until today represent a major component of 
international trade. “Empires were one of the earliest means of securing trade interests. Powerful 
states – from the Romans to the Ottomans, to the British – used influence and force to create 
colonial empires or ‘spheres of influence’ that gave their traders and manufacturers secure access 
to foreign markets.”10 Reminiscent of today’s situation, powerful states were keen to grasp power 
and influence in the area of trade already hundreds of years ago. Due to trade being as important 
to kings, merchants and peasants as it is to presidents, firms and ordinary citizens today, its’ rules 
and regulations have developed consistently along the way and many components of international 
trade agreements can be traced back to earlier agreements. “Since most European countries also 
routinely restricted the extent to which foreign ships could carry goods to and from their ports, 
especially in their increasingly important trade with overseas colonies, early bilateral trade 
treaties did not attempt  to dismantle these domestic protections, but merely sought to ensure that 
a foreign merchant marine was treated no less favourably than other foreign shipping – leading to 
the inclusion of a ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) clause in some early treaties.”11 The ‘most 
favoured nation’ clause refers to the clause where a nation-state must make the conditions for 
every member of an agreement the same as the most-favoured nation. One can argue that today’s 
                                                  
10 World Trade Report 2011, WTO 
11World Trade Report 2011, WTO 
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state of international trade began to be shaped around the times of colonialism, because during 
these times some basic rules and guidelines were established.  
The 19th century was also influential in shaping today’s state of international trade, with 
Great Britain being a heavy open-trade advocate. Great Britain’s politicians realized that if 
Britain’s borders are opened to other countries’ products, it will have a better chance at exporting 
its own products. However, due to the depression in the second part of the 19th century, many 
nation-states closed their borders and shifted back towards more protective policies. It can be 
noted, that times of economic depression and stagnation usually go along with individual 
governments’ policies shifting towards protectionism. On the other hand, in times of economic 
prosperity, nation-states tend to open their borders and practice liberal trade policies. This 
phenomenon can be related to the events of the 20th century, where one can witness nation-states 
closing their borders during The Great Depression of the 1930s and during the times of the two 
world wars. Conversely, one can witness the establishment of the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs in 1948, representative of a shift towards openness.  
The on-going battle between regionalism and multilateralism will be a key topic 
throughout future chapters as there is an on-going debate among students, professors and 
politicians regarding these two major frameworks of international trade. While regionalism refers 
to a group of countries, typically united by geographical proximity, opening up their borders to 
each other and giving each other favourable trading conditions, multilateralism refers to 
agreements among a much larger group of countries, preferably all nation-states involved in 
trading. The most typical example of multilateralism is the World Trade Organization, an 
intergovernmental organization that looks to oversee and promote liberal policies in international 
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trade. Prior to the establishment of the WTO in the 1990s, the post-war era of the 20th century 
represented several waves of regionalism.  
The first wave of regionalism in the 20th century took place in post-war Europe. As 
Europe was emotionally and economically torn after the conclusion of World War II, it began to 
seek a financial resurrection in the form of regional trade. This led to the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community which later turned into the European Economic Community. 
While GATT multilateral trade talks in the form of the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds strived to not 
put nation-states outside of the EEC at a disadvantage, it could not prevent the evolving 
regionalism in Europe and the last decade of the 20th century marked a major step in Europe’s 
regional initiatives. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 removed the remaining barriers to trade within 
members of the relatively newly established European Union and established a single market in 
the EU and a common currency, the Euro.  
Regional cooperation in Europe motivated other regions for entering into similar regional 
trade agreements. The United States of America also leaned towards regionalism and bilateralism 
in the 20th century. “Having eschewed regionalism in favour of multilateralism for almost 40 
years, the United States suddenly shifted strategies, embarking on an ambitious programme of 
bilateral negotiations that included, first, a free trade agreement with Israel in 1985, and then, 
more dramatically, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement in 1988, later trilateralized to include 
Mexico in NAFTA in the early 1990s.”12 Furthermore, regionalism was also booming in Asia, 
with the establishment of ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the 
establishment of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). It is clear that the developments of 
the 20th century, despite several rounds of talks organized by GATT, were clearly leaning 
                                                  
12 World Trade Report, 2011 
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towards a regional approach rather than a multilateral approach. Most countries realized that 
being able to promote its agenda and defend its national interests is much easier on a regional 
level and that is the greatest benefit of regional agreements in comparison to multilateral 
agreements for individual nation-states. However, one can argue that this benefit comes at the 
expense of the multilateral negotiations. Furthermore, with the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization, the regional developments of the 20th century have caused a multifaceted 
international trade arena in which one must not search long to find a series of divisive elements 
regarding multilateralism and regionalism. In order to get a closer look on this dilemma, the 
evolution of PTAs will be analyzed and the conditions of various important regional and bilateral 
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Chapter III: Actors 
     
Regulation of international trade is a complex issue because it involves a large amount of 
actors such as intergovernmental organizations, the media, the market, the civic sector, the 
nation-state and individuals pursuing their own personal interests. The complexity is further 
exaggerated by the varying ideologies and values of the actors involved. Even though the 
presence of evil can not be eliminated, it can be tamed, as has been proven by the use of the 
‘invisible hand of the market’ and portrayed by Adam Smith’s butcher. “It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their 
regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, 
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”13 Moreover, the rapid 
improvement of global telecommunications, for example the internet, is an example of an 
external force which can positively influence global awareness of issues relating to inequality or 
environmental protection.  
The main actors involved in international trade are consumers, producers, IGOs and 
domestic governments. These actors all function as regulators of international trade. Furthermore, 
the influence of the media and NGOs must also be noted. When analyzing the various actors 
involved, it is possible to apply Immanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory, which identifies 
the basic unit as world systems and separates nation-states into states in the core, states in the 
semi-periphery and states in the periphery. This division is what represents the division of labour 
in the world, where states at the core are mostly involved in higher skill capital-intensive 
production and states at the periphery are involved in lower skill labour-intensive production. The 
                                                  
13Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776 
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inequalities of international trade and the difference between a free market and a fair market can 
be connected to Wallerstein’s world system theory. 
     Nation-states can function as regulators by implicating various economic policies. Firstly, 
currency measures can negatively impact the economic market. There have been many debates 
on China’s exchange rate manoeuvres, where China decreases the value of its currency to attract 
foreign investment and therefore boosts its economy. Governments can also function as 
regulators by imposing tariffs. Tariffs are taxes on imported products, which give domestic 
producers an advantage over foreign producers and therefore distort the balance of international 
trade created by the supply and demand forces of the market. Since it is often the case that 
imported goods are further used for domestic production, tariffs can act negatively even on 
domestic production. Trebilcock states, “Tariffs, in contrast, distort both domestic production and 
consumption decisions, first by attracting resources into the protected sector and second by 
raising prices to consumers above world prices, which in general reflect least cost means of 
production, thus inducing consumers to allocate their resources to less preferred forms of 
consumption.”14One can argue that state intervention through fiscal and monetary policies such 
as currency measures and the imposition of tariffs can be considered as destructive to fair trade 
and the global welfare of human beings. Other trade-distorting measures which will be discussed 
in latter sections are non-tariff trade barriers which include technical barriers to trade, subsidies to 
local producers or customs duties.  
Overall, one can argue that the main driving force behind bilateral, regional or multilateral 
negotiations is mainly economic interest. This economic interest may depend partially on cultural 
issues or political pressures, but nevertheless it can be argued that economic interest is the main 
                                                  
14Trebilcock, 2005. p.75 
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factor in countries’ trade negotiations. 
     The role of the civic sector is also vital to the regulation of international trade, mostly through 
consumer choice in the market, but also by granting policy-makers authority through democratic 
elections. Consumers have the choice of which product they buy and which product they neglect. 
Consumer choice can be portrayed by the following example: even though coffee produced out of 
fair trade beans may be slightly more expensive, a consumer may make the ‘economically 
irrational’ choice of choosing this product over a mainstream, slightly cheaper product. 
Furthermore, the civic sector may also affect international trade by migration and therefore 
shifting the size of the labor force from one country to another and altering the market 
environment of a particular nation-state. Other aspects of civic sector involvement are 
demonstrations and the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in raising awareness 
related to the social injustices revolving around trade and also environmental issues. The political 
legitimacy granted to policy-makers, through democratic elections or lack of demonstration, 
should not be underestimated. These are all crucial components of the civic sector and represent 
the involvement of every-day people in the regulation of international trade. 
     The media also serves as a regulator of international trade because its function is to raise 
awareness of the local, national and global issues. With today’s state of globalization, many of 
these issues may relate to international trade in one way or another. The media, through tools 
such as television, radio, newspapers and internet, has the power to change the viewers’ 
perception on nearly any topic. However, unless they are surfing the world wide web, viewers do 
not have a wide selection of what they become exposed to. This may lead to corruption in the 
media sector where, for example, governments influence the media by making arrangements with 
broadcasting stations to show news that will support the policies preferred by either the ruling 
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party or the opposition. With that being said, the media must also be regulated in a way that 
viewers get fair access to truthful information rather than manipulative information. With the 
number of internet users growing, the internet may impact the media in a positive way because it 
gives viewers the liberty to surf through millions of alternative sources. One can therefore hope, 
that in years to come, people will be informed and encouraged to act on the controversial issues 
of international trade.  
 An interesting theory that relates to the media as an actor in public policy is the agenda-
setting theory. This theory points out that the media is one of the most influential actors involved 
because it has the power to choose which topics to bring to the public’s attention and/or 
emphasize their importance. Therefore, the media also has the power of reducing the importance 
of other issues. “Through their day-by-day selection and display of the news, editors and news 
directors focus attention and influence the public’s perceptions of what are the most important 
issues of the day.”15 The agenda-setting theory is relevant to the regulation of international trade 
because it portrays how the media has a strong influence over what the public reads, hears and 
sees, which issues will be debated and which policy areas should be reviewed or altered. 
The actors involved in international trade and its’ regulation all have different interests 
and aims and so it is important that they provide legitimacy to and respect the principles and 
decision-making of supranational organizations such as the WTO or the United Nations. 
However, in practice the situation is not so ideal. In practice, most of the power belongs to 
governments of individual nation-states, lobbyists and multi-national corporations. These actors 
dictate conditions of trade and often make scholars and students question the de facto power and 
influence of the WTO. Nevertheless, the WTO is a combination of the nation-states which have 
                                                  
15McCombs, 2004, p.1 
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opted to pursue multilateral trade negotiations. Therefore, one can argue that as the world is 
becoming more and more globalized and as we have witnessed the creation of several major 
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                                              Chapter IV: Ethics and Trade 
 
     “This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and powerful, and to despise or, at 
least, neglect persons of poor and mean conditions, though necessary both to establish and to 
maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most 
universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments.”16 Vast class and wealth differences 
between members of communities have been present at least since the times of Ancient Egypt or 
Ancient Mesopotamia, and arguably even since the times of hunters and gatherers. While these 
differences have been recognized, and through the years often debated by moralists, philosophers, 
rulers, politicians and ordinary citizens, human kind has not been able to come to a clear-cut 
conclusion regarding the ethical dilemma of vast class differentials. Furthermore, the 
phenomenon of trade, which has been occurring for thousands of years, has made it possible for 
countries, cities, and individuals to prosper from trade and also to enjoy resources which would 
otherwise not be available. On the other hand, a few individuals have also been able to reap most 
of the benefits of various trade activities which has led to many scholars questioning the current 
state of world trading system. These statements portray the two-sided coin of international trade. 
“Trade in itself, for example when it involved the transportation of goods, might be beneficial to 
society and deserving of a reward. It is only the iniquity of the trader by which the profession 
might become tainted, not by a defect inherent in itself.”17 
On one hand, developing countries have been acquiring special treatment when it comes 
to multilateral trade agreements. Stiglitz confirms, “To the extent that they participated at all, 
                                                  
16 Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759 
17 Spiegel, The Growth of Economic Thought, 1999 
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they campaigned for special treatment. This took the form of preferential access to the rich 
countries’ markets at tariff rates below those applied to other countries (eventually enshrined in 
the Generalized System of Preferences) and exemptions from GATT rules. Article XVIII in the 
GATT rules provided developing countries with differential treatment. Among other exceptions, 
it allowed economies ‘which can only support low standards of living and are in the early stages 
of development’ to ‘implement programmes and policies of economic development designed to 
raise the general standard of living of their people, to take protective or other measures affecting 
imports’. This recognized the right of developing countries to impose quantitative and other 
restrictions to protect their infant industries.” 18 Due to Article XVIII of the GATT, developing 
countries were able to avoid obligations imposed on developed countries while taking advantage 
of GATT membership. While some may argue that developing countries received special 
treatment and this proves that developed countries were concerned about the welfare of the 
developing world, one must not forget that many developing countries had a disadvantage aging 
from the times of colonization. Moreover, developed countries accepted the special treatment 
conditions mainly because their own national interest also lay in opening the markets of 
developing countries. The markets of developing countries often provided producers in 
developed countries with intermediate resources which they used to further produce a particular 
good at which they had a comparative advantage. On the other hand, one can argue that 
developing countries are often suffering from trade conditions resulting from bilateral or regional 
trade negotiations in which they do not have much input because of their relatively weak 
economic and political power. Even though the WTO, IMF and other organizations recognize the 
need to help and provide aid for developing and LDCs (least developed countries), many scholars 
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are sceptical about the fairness of many PTAs and their trade conditions. Whether ethics and 
morals are a part of human activities such as trade depend solely on whether ethics and morals 
are of importance to the individuals/groups in charge. 
    “About 1.7 billion people in the 109 countries covered by the MPI (Multidimensional Poverty 
Index)—a third of their population — live in multidimensional poverty — that is, with at least 33 
percent of the indicators reflecting acute deprivation in health, education and standard of 
living.”19While this is not the responsibility of trade activities, one can argue that trade, when 
regulated with ethical manners, has the capability to, at least partially, improve the well-being of 
many of the world‘s poorest individuals. “The distribution of the benefits of global relations 
depends not only on domestic policies, but also on a variety of international social arrangements, 
including trade agreements, patent laws, global health initiatives, international educational 
provisions, facilities for technological dissemination, ecological and environmental restraint, 
treatment of accumulated debts (often incurred by irresponsible military rulers of the past), and 
the restraining of conflicts and local wars.”20 International trade can prove to be a savior for many 
underdeveloped or developing countries, as has proven to be the case with some of the ‘Asian 
Tigers’ in the 20th century. However, opening up a country’s borders to trade is not the only 
ingredient in the recipe to success as the result also depends on the policies of other, potentially 
more developed, countries. Developed countries have an advantage because they are not, in most 
cases, so dependent on trade of a particular resource. This is where the international trade arena 
becomes unbalanced and allows developed countries to set the conditions of various trade 
                                                  
19 Multidimensional Poverty Index, UNDP, 2010 
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agreements. One can argue that ignoring this issue while the world’s poorest billion citizens 
suffer from poverty or malnutrition could be considered as strongly unethical. 
    Developed countries usually have the power to set the rules and conditions of the bilateral, 
regional or multilateral agreements. “They have negotiated the reduction of tariffs and the 
elimination of subsidies for the goods in which they have a comparative advantage, but are more 
reluctant to open up their own markets and eliminate their own subsidies in other areas where the 
developing countries have an advantage.”21 One can argue that such behavior by powerful 
countries is unethical and can create difficulties for developing countries which are dependent on 
the export of various resources. However, such difficulties can be a result of more reasons, such 
as internal problems or corruption. There are various reasons for a country’s difficulties in 
economic development and these reasons will be analyzed in further chapters, using quantitative 
data and a case study.  
Another issue which makes it difficult for developing countries to remain competitive in 
their strong sectors is that many developed countries are protecting the sectors which have 
actually shifted towards regions providing cheaper labour. Naturally, domestic governments are 
looking to protect the jobs of their own citizens and so their respective governments provide 
funds to allow those sectors to continue functioning, despite the fact that the supply-demand 
forces of the market would have shifted workers from these sectors to other sectors (or possibly 
to unemployment). A great example is the manufacturing industry in the United States, which has 
been declining due to the pressures from developing countries cheap labour. Nevertheless, the 
United States continues to protect its’ manufacturing industry and that often puts developing 
countries under pressure. Another example of how developed countries protect their industries is 
                                                  
21Stiglitz, 2005, p.12 
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the example of the agricultural sector in Europe. The EU, through its Common Agricultural 
Policy, supports local EU farmers by providing them with subsidies. A subsidy is “a direct or 
indirect payment, economic concession, or privilege granted by a government to private firms, 
households, or other governmental units in order to promote a public objective.”22Subsidies can 
be considered as a government’s tool to increase the productivity of a particular industrial sector. 
Such intervention was already considered unnecessary and trade-distorting in the 17th century. In 
the ‘Essay on the East-India Trade’, Charles Davenant argues against trade-encouraging activities: 
“Wisdom is most commonly in the wrong when it pretends to direct nature…As it is great folly to 
compel a youth to that sort of study to which he is not adapted by genius and inclination, so it can 
never be wise to endeavour the introducing into a country either the growth of any commodity or 
any manufacture for which nor the soil nor the general bent of the people is proper.”23 Providing 
subsidies to sectors, which do not have a natural comparative advantage in relation to the same 
sectors of other nation-states, can be considered as trade-distorting because it puts producers with 
the natural comparative advantage at a disadvantage. Moreover, many developing countries rely 
on the production or cultivation of one or very few products, and therefore such trade-distorting 
activities as subsidies can have a great impact on the well-being of a developing country’s 
citizens.The issue of subsidies and other protective measures such as technical barriers to trade 
will be analyzed in more detail in further sections. 
Related strongly to ethics and becoming more and more common in the sphere of trade is 
the notion of fair trade. “Fair trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency, and 
respect, that seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development 
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by offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers and 
workers- especially in the South. Fair trade organization (backed by consumers) are engaged 
actively in supporting producers, awareness raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules 
and practice of conventional trade.”24 One of the main aims of fair trade is not only to create 
respect between producers and consumers, but also to lobby for better conditions for producers, 
who are often bullied by larger distributors and left with little choice but to sell their produce at 
low prices, receiving a small share of the final sale price of the good. Furthermore, fair trade 
products, with typical examples being coffee or bananas, also aim at spreading awareness and 
informing the average consumer of the common disparities in the trade of goods and services.  
Even though the fair trade movement looks to improve the conditions of the growers and 
producers in developing countries and raise awareness ofsome of the inequalities in international 
trade, the volume of fair trade products opposed to normal products is quite low. Such an 
unbalanced ratio can cause some farmers to have an advantage compared to other farmers and 
can lead to tensions among local farmers. Lyon confirms, “Because most producers of any given 
commodity lack such access, however, the differential distribution of higher fair trade prices is 
likely to result in heightened economic disparities within producer communities.”25 In such a 
sense, one can argue that fair trade movements contradict with neoliberal policies of free trade 
because they benefit only a part of the producers while putting the rest of the producers under 
more economic pressure. “Henrici argues that those who sympathize with the goals of alternative 
trade need to articulate a set of universal trading rights, analogous and perhaps related to those of 
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human rights as expressed in the charters of various multinational organizations.”26 It can be 
stated that fair trade is a vital part of the struggle for increased social justice in international trade, 
fighting to improve the moral aspects of trade and fighting to provide ethics a larger role in future 
trade negotiations and trade agreements. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that the uneven ratio 
of fair trade products in relation to ‘normal’ products is a setback to the fair trade movement and 
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Chapter V: Preferential Trade Agreements 
 
Theoretically, the ideal form of liberalization exists on a unilateral level, meaning that 
nation-states would open up their markets to other countries without having to negotiate any 
conditions, removing negotiating costs and preventing countries from pursuing national interests 
when negotiating with weaker trading partners. Unilateral liberalization of markets is not viable, 
because governments may not necessarily trust other sovereign nation-states to open their 
markets and apply equal trading conditions. Negotiations to achieve trade agreements take place 
instead. When successful, negotiations lead to the signing of a preferential trade agreement and of 
a free-trade area, customs union or simply by applying lower tariffs than the WTO agreed 
standard. For the purposes of this research, regional and bilateral trade agreements will be 
referred to as preferential trade agreements (PTAs). 
A preferential trade agreement (PTA), as the name itself implies, refers to an agreement 
between two or more countries, providing the signees of the agreement with favourable trading 
conditions. Preferential trade agreements can take the form offree trade agreements or customs 
unions with common external tariffs. The amount of Preferential Trade Agreements has increased 
greatly since the 1950s. Figure 2 in the Appendix clearly depicts the great increase, portraying the 
increase in the average number of PTAs per WTO member from two to twelve within a period of 
fifty years. While this occurrence can be explained by the export-oriented policies of many 
nation-states and therefore a natural demand for trade agreements, it can also be considered as 
conflicting with the multilateral approach to trade. “Of the 380 PTAs notified to the WTO as of 
2007, 300 agreements were notified under Article XXIV of the GATT, 22 agreements involving 
developing countries were notified under the Enabling Clause, and 58 under Article V of the 
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GATS.”27 Given that preferential trade agreements lead to a reduction of trade barriers, they 
comply with the fundamental WTO intention of reducing trade barriers globally. Article XXIV of 
the GATT provides for the legal exception and states: 
“5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the 
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the 
adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-
trade area; provided that: 
(a) With respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of 
a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the 
institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with 
contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole 
be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and 
regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the 
formation of such union or the adoption  of such interim agreement, as the case 
may be; 
7. (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or a free-trade area, 
or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall 
promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to them 
such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to make 
such reports or recommendations to contracting parties as they may deep appropriate. 
8. For the purposes of this Agreement:  
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 (a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single 
customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that 
 (i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, 
those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with 
respect to substantially all the trade between constituent territories of the union or at 




Even though preferential trade agreements are compatible with the WTO principles, one 
can question the effect on future multilateral trade talks. Given that it is easier for countries to 
apply their points of interest and given that preferential trade agreements are naturally concluded 
faster than multilateral agreements, governments of both developed and developing countries 
seemingly favour preferential trade agreements. Preferential trade agreements can be considered 
as a form of selected liberalization because a nation-state chooses to open selected markets only 
to a selected amount of nation-states rather than to all nation-states. In return, the selected nation-
states open up their markets. One can make the assumption that this quid-pro-quo negotiation can 
put least developed and developing nation-states who do not have much to offer to foreign 
consumers at a disadvantage. While some scholars argue that preferential trade agreements are a 
natural occurrence and support further economic integration among nation-states, others argue 
that preferential trade agreements are contradicting to the principles of multilateral agreements 
signed by most nation-states.   
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As this work will seek to unravel disparities in international trade regarding developing 
countries, focus must also be made on whether PTAs are being established between developed 
countries, developing countries or between developed and developing countries. By analyzing 
Figure 1 in the appendix, one can conclude that most PTAs are signed between developing and 
developing nation-states and the least frequent PTAs are between developed and developed 
nation-states. The danger lies in agreements between economically powerful countries and 
economically weak countries. A developing or least developed country will sometimes agree to 
lopsided conditions because it may fear that it would otherwise lose market access to a very 
important product for its consumers or producers. Baldwin confirms, “These tend to be more 
fully implemented but often involve very lopsided tariff cutting since most rich nations had 
already lowered their MFN tariffs in GATT Rounds. In other words, they carry the threat of 
diverting import sources for the developing nation partner (which typically maintains high MFN 
tariffs) but much less so for the developed partner.” 29 One must also consider that lobbying may 
be a crucial factor in the signing of preferential trade agreements. Regardless of whether signed 
between developed-developed, developed-developing or developing-developing countries, PTAs 
can be considered as an on-going trend in the international trade system. It is also important to 
realize that most PTAs are signed because of the stalled talks on the multilateral level. Logically, 
one can assume that it is easier for countries to negotiate with one or two trading partners rather 
than with all WTO members at once. On the other hand, one can argue that preferential trade 
agreements are controversial in respect to some of the most important WTO principles, the 
principle of non-discrimination and the MFN (most-favoured nation) principle. By providing 
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favourable conditions for the PTA’s members, in the form of tariff reductions or elimination of 
other trade barriers, it may discriminate the non-members and their producers.  
Geographically, PTAs do not always consist of countries in the same region. Such PTAs, 
consisting of nation-states in various geographical locations (eg. between EU and Mexico) could 
be considered more controversial than purely regional trade agreements, where the agreement can 
be associated with the logical assumption of geographical proximity – and hence lower 
transportation costs. Regardless of the distance between the members of the PTA, PTAs may 
oppose one of the most important WTO principles: the principle of non-discrimination. While 
some scholars argue that regional trade agreements and preferential trade agreements are a 
natural reaction of the interconnected business world, hence assisting further economic and 
political integration, other scholars consider the signing of PTAs trade-distorting and 
discriminatory. On the other hand, it must be noted that some scholars also consider PTAs and 
regionalism as a healthy complement to multilateralism. Even though the rising amount of 
preferential trade agreements can endanger talks and negotiations on a multilateral level, there are 
certain merits of the WTO which cannot be endangered by bilateral or regional trade talks. The 
WTO continues to play a vital role with its Dispute Settlement Mechanism and also with 
monitoring trade policy developments and providing a forum for multilateral negotiations. Both 
the risks and the benefits associated with preferential trade agreements will be outlined and 
discussed in latter sections. 
  Nation-states decide to enter into preferential trade agreements for several reasons. 
Firstly, preferential trade agreements improve market access for exporters by eliminating tariffs 
and other trade-distorting policies such as technical barriers to trade. The economic incentives for 
countries to pursue PTAs are of great importance and therefore one can witness many of the 
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developed countries competing over market access to newly emerging countries which provide 
appealing markets. “Especially from the view of developing and emerging countries, market 
access and market protection is likewise a main motive for the frequent agreements with 
industrial nations in their region. Moreover, in regionalisation these countries see an opportunity 
to underpin (lock-in) the credibility of their structural reforms and attract foreign investors.”30 
Moreover, with today’s relatively cheap transportation network, countries are seeking agreements 
with countries outside of their region as well.   
Secondly, PTAs offer deeper integration among members of the agreement because 
members can agree on and integrate in policy areas that are not included in WTO agreements.  
Thirdly, many countries, in particular developed countries such as the United States, 
Japan or the European Union, are becoming less and less patient with the slow progress of 
multilateral negotiations. Multilateral negotiations are often stalled by fast-growing developing 
countries such as China, Brazil or India. Baldwin states, “There is little sign that Brazil, India, 
and China are switching their attitude towards the multilateral trade system in line with the 
growing global importance of their trade flows. They are not switching to leadership roles in the 
WTO. Brazil and China, and to some extent India, are finding that regionalism is an excellent 
route to getting better market access for their exporters. They are learning that regionalism is the 
fast, easy and controllable way to liberalise trade; multilateral trade talks are the slow, hard and 
uncontrollable path. Similar trends are affecting political leaders in the US, the EU, Japan and 
Canada; they too are starting to find that the regionalism route may be a better, easier and faster 
way to get improved market access from developing nations.”31 
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Yet another reason is that with the growing amount of PTAs, nation-states who do not 
take part in PTAs with other nation-states put themselves at a disadvantage in comparison to 
nation-states who do enter into PTAs and thus get more favourable trading conditions for their 
exporting producers.32 In general, one can note that nation-states enter into PTAs with other 
nation-states because it provides them with favourable trading conditions and thus gives them a 
better opportunity at economic growth and prosperity. Nonetheless, the famous proverb ‘one 
man’s pain is another man’s pleasure’ can be ascribed to this behaviour in the international trade 
arena.  
Furthermore, countries choose to enter PTAs, because in today’s globalized world, more 
and more production relies on intermediate goods. These are goods produced in one country 
while being required for the production of a good in another country. Preferential trade 
agreements are vital to countries relying on intermediate goods. Other reasons why countries may 
choose to enter into preferential trade agreements are not related to economic benefits of free 
trade. Indirect benefits such as political partnership with another country may be the case. 
Political pressures from an influential country may encourage smaller countries to enter into trade 
agreements because of indirect benefits. It may be that non-economic issues such as national 
security, peace or common environmental issues can also provide motivation for countries to 
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Dangers of PTAs 
 
As the number of PTAs has increased rapidly over the past few years, one must wonder 
about the dangers of PTAs to the multilateral network. While the benefits and motivations for 
countries to sign PTAs are more or less clear and revolve around economic and political national 
interests, the dangers of PTAs must be outlined as well. It can be argued that one of the main 
negative effects of regionalism to the multilateral trading system is that regionalism affects global 
market access by giving trading partners of the particular PTA better trading conditions, causing 
‘artificial competitive advantage’. “The negative effect of trade diversion is caused by the fact 
that possibly more efficient suppliers from non-member countries that are discriminated against 
by the association are replaced by competitors from the partner country who are more expensive 
and can only ‘artificially’ offer goods and services at a lower price owing to the agreement. Seen 
from a global perspective, this situation can lead to ineffective specialisation and a questionable 
allocation of resources.”33 While market access for producers outside of the preferential trade 
area can be a serious issue, causing shifts of production from areas where a country would 
naturally have comparative advantage to production in areas where it may not be as competitive 
as in the initial market, it is not the only danger of PTAs. 
 Baldwin states, “The real threat is that regionalism is becoming so pervasive that it may 
soon be the rule rather than the exception. It could contribute in a forceful way to the erosion of 
WTO-centricity in the world trade system.”34 Baldwin and other scholars recognize that the rapid 
increase in regional trade agreements can push multilateralism out of the way and become a norm 
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for countries willing to negotiate on trade issues. The main reason for this is clear and obvious: 
nation-states find it easier to move forward with their areas of interest in trade talks involving a 
smaller amount of members. The WTO website states one of its principles as “A country should 
not discriminate between its trading partners and it should not discriminate between its own and 
foreign products, services or nationals.”35 Whether preferential trade agreements, providing a 
signee of the of the PTA better market access to certain goods or services, are a form of 
discrimination is up for debate. Logically, it is easier to negotiate with one or two other countries 
rather than with over 150 countries. Therefore, with the amount of preferential trade agreements 
increasing rapidly, there is less and less incentive for countries to negotiate on a multilateral level. 
Hence, many countries are often not willing to sacrifice something in order to move forward with 
multilateral trade talks because they know that when negotiating on a bilateral or regional level 
they will not have to sacrifice (or they will have to sacrifice less). One can only speculate 
whether the stalemate of the Doha Development Round is in any way connected to the 
proliferation of PTAs. 
 Another threat that PTAs pose is the threat to norms and values which have been 
established by the WTO, especially issues of fairness which have been promoted especially in the 
Doha Development Round. Some critics argue that failures of the Doha Development Round, 
combined with the vast proliferation of PTAs are proof that there is an evident shift from 
multilateralism to regionalism. Baldwin argues, “The emergence of RTAs between uneven 
nations – be it between the trade giants, the US, the EU and Japan and developing nations, or 
between the trade giants, India, China and Brazil and developing nations – tend to undermine this 
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‘fairness’.”36 Clearly, Baldwin and other scholars recognize that there is a big asymmetry in 
economic power between the North and the South. Moreover, there are also differences in the 
institutional capacity between the North and the South, making negotiation and bargaining more 
difficult for least developed countries. Very often it is the case, that less developed or developing 
countries lack vital institutional resources and therefore their negotiating capabilities are 
weakened in comparison to developed countries.   
 Posing a further danger, preferential trade agreements are mostly notified to the WTO 
when they are already agreed to and signed by its members. Other countries therefore seek their 
own PTAs in order to remain competitive. Glania confirms, “WTO members should already be 
informed at the time when such negotiations are initiated. Thereby, the WTO members that are 
not included are supposed to be given the opportunity to exert an influence on the creation of 
regional trade agreements. This consultation process is non-binding, however, and not used in 
general.”37 One can imagine that it is very challenging for the WTO to interfere with preferential 
trade agreements or to challenge the conditions at which they are signed because of the 
sovereignty of individual nation-states and also because the agreements are mostly notified when 
the negotiations have already been concluded and the agreements have already been signed. This 
is an area in which the WTO should perhaps advocate more fairness and transparency by pushing 
its members to notify the agreements when they are in a negotiating phase. An ideal solution 
would be if negotiations on bilateral or regional levels took place in official WTO negotiating 
forums, with representatives of countries not involved in negotiations, having the right of being 
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present and possibly interfering with negotiations if the negotiations would not comply with 
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   Chapter VI: Interview with WTO 
 
 The World Trade Organization is a key organization in today’s regulation of international 
trade. Even though its’ de facto powers are in the hands of individual nation-states and therefore 
often questioned by scholars world-wide, the World Trade Organization can nevertheless be 
considered the most influential intergovernmental organization in the international trade arena. In 
order to get a better insight on how the WTO feels about the current state of international trade, 
the deadlock of the Doha Round and about the rapid increase of preferential trade agreements in 
the past few years, an interview with Rohini Acharya, the Chief of section of the Regional Trade 
Agreement Section in the Trade Policy Review Division of the WTO, was conducted on March 
5th, 2013. Following each question, there will be comments on the given answer.  
 
Q: Dear Ms. Acharya. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to conduct this interview. The 
topic of this interview will be the dilemma between multilateral agreements and regional trade 
agreements.  Furthermore, activities which can be considered as barriers to trade will be 
discussed. Can you please describe your position in the WTO? 
A: I am the chief of section of the Regional Trade Agreement Section in the Trade Policies 
Review Division of the WTO. 
 
Section 1: Introduction and objectives 
Q: Thank you. The WTO is a multilateral organization which functions as a regulator of 
international trade. Could you please briefly define the main objectives of the WTO? 
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A: The main objectives could be different depending on who you are in the WTO. But for 
me personally, the objectives of the WTO is to firstly ensure a rules-based international trading 
system and to facilitate discussions between WTO members to reduce tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade. 
Comment: Ideally, objectives should not be different depending on who you are. Members of the 
WTO have all signed identical agreements and therefore one can assume that their objectives as 
members of the WTO would be the same. Even though priorities may be different, the WTO 
must also push its members to think and act alike when it comes to setting and carrying out the 
objectives of the WTO. 
 
Q: How would you describe WTOs success carrying out those objectives?  
A: In the area of tariffs there has been considerable success because tariffs are now down to 
approximately 4-5% on average across the world. In the area of non-tariff barriers there have 
been greater difficulties mainly because we don’t know what the non-tariff barriers are and we 
don’t know how to measure many of them. And some of the non-tariff barriers are simply not 
within the scope of the WTO; members have not agreed to including them in the WTO. 
Comment:  Non-tariff barriers will be discussed in later sections as they are also a crucial part of 
trade regulation. The difficulty of measuring non-tariff trade barriers poses a major threat to trade 
liberalization across the world. One can question the success of the WTO in reducing tariff 
barriers because one can assume that a nation-state can replace tariff barriers with non-tariff 
barriers. Therefore, quantitative data in regards to tariff barriers may not be accurate because 
tariff barriers can be replaced by non-tariff barriers. Moreover, the success of tariffs can be 
considered as a partial success because the tariffs have only been decreased from approx. 10% to 
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approx 4-5%, which one can consider only a partial success due to the amount of resources 
involved over the long period of negotiations. This may also be a reason why many members are 
frustrated with the entire process.  
 
Q: Based on the WTO website, the first objective is to ‘set and enforce rules for international 
trade’. How are the rules enforced by the WTO? Is it challenging going up against the 
sovereignty of national governments or the capacity of multi-national organizations? 
A: First of all, the WTO is the sum of its members so it is really up to the members to decide how 
the rules are enforced. They bring cases to the WTO, they bring complaints to the WTO and the 
WTO has a framework to address those complaints. The extent to which they are able to enforce 
those rules depends on international law, the weaknesses of international law and the willingness 
of its members to enforce their own rules. It is challenging in the sense of whether national 
governments choose to enforce the rules. If the national governments choose to not enforce the 
rules there is not much the WTO can actually do.  
Comment: It is also important to mention the way business is operated has changed greatly over 
the past 10 years. Today, firms and companies are moving around and the production network is 
based on several different countries. The production process is disintegrated and there are usually 
several stages of production. This means that companies want this process to be as smooth as 
possible, with as few tariffs as possible on the different stages of production. This is what is 
motivating companies and firms to push nation-states to pursue bilateral and regional trade 
agreements with the partners involved in the production process. 
Q: Are there noticeable differences between the various cultures in their approach to multilateral 
negotiations? Please elaborate with the use of an example. 
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A: Yes, I think that the East, for example the Asian governments, tend to base their disputes much 
more on resolving them through consultation whereas the West, for example the US, takes a 
much more legalistic attitude. 
 
Q: The second objective is ‘to provide a forum for negotiating and monitoring further trade 
liberalization’. Do you feel the amount of negotiations regarding trade liberalization is sufficient? 
Are national governments, in particular the governments of developed countries, doing the 
maximum to liberalize trade?  
A: I don’t know how you would measure whether negotiations are sufficient. I suppose if you 
achieve what you are looking for then they are sufficient. In the moment we have not achieved 
what we are looking for but it is not clear that that is because there is not a sufficient amount of 
negotiations. I think there are differences in opinions, which means that countries are still far 
apart in terms of deciding. I think to a large extent, especially in the area of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, developed countries are the ones that have made the efforts so far. The current round is 
about trying to bring in some of the developing countries as well into liberalizing their own trade 
barriers. It depends on what kind of barriers you look at. If you look at barriers that are inside 
the country, behind the border, then possibly both developing and developed countries have not 
done a sufficient amount to reduce those barriers. 
Q: The fourth objective is to increase the transparency of the decision-making process. Could you 
elaborate on that? What concrete steps are taken to increase transparency? 
A: Several steps have been taken to increase transparency. This division is one of the divisions, 
which enforces the transparency aspect of the WTO. The trade policy review body was set up in 
the late 80s simply to review the trade policy of all member governments without any 
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implications of a dispute. So it’s basically a peer review, a review by all members and all 
countries are subject to it. There are other kinds of mechanisms that also exist. We also monitor 
regional trade agreements. There is a trade monitoring exercise that goes on several times a year 
which monitors barriers to trade to see whether they have gone up or down.  
 
Q: The sixth objective, which is to help developing countries benefit fully from the global trading 
system, will be one of the focuses of this project. Why is the WTO responsible for helping 
developing countries?  
A: I would argue it is not responsible for helping developing countries. It is responsible for 
helping all countries and its responsible countries improve economic growth through 
liberalization of economic growth. It just happens that developing countries form the largest part 
of the membership of the WTO. 
 
Section 2: Regionalism vs. multilateralism 
Q: “According to most classical liberal economists, the goal of free trade, cherished by the WTO, 
will lead to the optimal utilization of the factors of production in ways that reflect variations in 
comparative advantage. Such an optimal allocation will ultimately lead to an increase in 
collective welfare of all participants. (Michalak, 267)”  How do bilateral and regional agreements 
affect this goal?  
A: The WTO is much more of a mercantilist approach. If you take your example from 
international trade theory further, then unilateral liberalization is the best solution: reduce all 
your barriers to trade and it will be good for your consumers and for your producers and you 
will therefore be able to use comparative advantage in the way it is supposed to be used. 
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However, in the WTO the approach that is taken is ‘give me this and I will give you this’, it’s 
much more based on negotiations. I would argue that the WTO has been successful mainly 
because it succeeded in reducing, according to a formula which has been agreed between its 
members, trade barriers globally. Developed countries have done more, developing countries 
have done less and least developed countries have done nothing. I think that is because 
developing countries had the feeling they are at a disadvantage and therefore they should be 
asked to liberalize less. In other words, exports are good and imports are bad. Whereas today, in 
order to export you have to import. 
Q: Bilateral agreements have been increasingly dominating the international trade arena. One 
example of this development can be EU’s increased cooperation with the “Asian giants”. In your 
opinion, are bilateral agreements a form of protectionism?  
A: They could be, but I am not sure you can argue that for all bilateral agreements. Some 
bilateral agreements exist simply because parties wish to go beyond what currently exist in the 
multilateral trading system. One of the reasons for the sudden increase in bilateral and regional 
agreements is that the WTO negotiations are going nowhere and the countries that wish to 
liberalize further markets end up going to do so on their own. However, if you actually look at 
bilateral agreements, some of them would imply that in a sense there are certain sectors which 
you are willing to protect more. And it’s easier to do that on a bilateral level than on a 
multilateral level. On the multilateral level, at the moment what is happening in terms of 
discussions there is a formula that is agreed for cuts across the board, in both agricultural and 
non-agricultural sector. Whereas in the agricultural sector, there is a tendency to protect much 
more and it has nothing to do with being a developed or developing country. So yes, it could 
provide an incentive for some countries to continue to protect certain sectors. 
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Comment: This dilemma between distinguishing whether nation-states have the desire to 
liberalize further markets or the desire to protect some of their own markets (in particular 
agriculture) can be considered as one of the most challenging issues for the WTO in years to 
come. The intention is critical to global welfare in the long run and therefore the WTO should be 
able to distinguish whether preferential trade agreements are signed with the intention to 
liberalize further markets or to protect some of their own markets. When a nation-state seeks to 
protect its market, this can have a negative impact on the international trade flows and a negative 
impact on producers in third countries, which would otherwise have the comparative advantage 
in the given product. A case-study of the United States of America will portray this importance in 
Chapter IX. 
Q: What kind of effect do bilateral agreements between developed countries have on developing 
countries?  
A: It depends on whether it is one of their largest markets, the effect would be negative because 
they lose market shares. In general, regardless of whether it is between developed countries or 
between developed and developing countries. If it is a key market then your producers and 
exporters are likely to lose as a result of losing market shares. 
Comment: In terms of trade diversion in the short-term, one can argue that there is a negative 
impact for developing and least developed countries when agreements are signed between 
developed countries. Moreover, it is the least developed countries which have to rely more on 
their key markets because their level of capital is at this point in time not as established as the 
capital of developed countries. Besides the empirical impact to all countries, one can also argue 
that the least developed countries become marginalized or ignored as developed countries pursue 
agreements with the dynamically developing countries such as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, 
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China). Therefore, the role of the WTO is increased when it comes to protecting the interests of 
least developed countries and making sure they do not become politically marginalized from 
developed and developing countries. Regardless of the economic power of the countries signing 
the agreement, one can argue the losses of market shares to producers and exporters in countries 
not involved in preferential trade agreements are a consequence of other countries signing 
preferential trade agreements. On the other hand, there can be positive long-term effects of 
agreements between developed countries on least developed countries because such agreements 
can create larger economic activity and increase production demand from other countries. That is 
a dynamic effect which can be observed in years to come. However, in the short-run it remains 
important that least developed countries do not become marginalized or ignored due to the rising 
amount of preferential trade agreements. 
Q: Similar to bilateral agreements, regional trade agreements give member states beneficial 
trading conditions. Logically, this results in a disadvantage for nation-states outside of the 
particular region/agreement. What is the WTO’s perspective on regional agreements and how do 
you feel they will develop in the 21st century?  
A: We have fairly neutral view on regional trade agreements. We don’t know much about them 
because they are negotiated outside of the WTO. We only learn of them when they are actually 
notified to the WTO. Recently, we have started to look at them in more detail and thereafter they 
get reviewed. Since 2006, we have started to look at the agreements in greater detail and started 
to produce our own reports. So it means we are now in a better position to see what is going on 
inside of these regional agreements. In regards to the impact of these agreements, I’m not sure 
we have much of a view on that simply because regional agreements are here, they will continue 
to be here and it’s unlikely that we will be able to do anything about it. 
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Comment: In the 1990s there was a fundamental approach to preferential trade agreements in a 
sense that it was an either/or choice between regional and bilateral trade agreements or 
multilateral agreements. With the proliferation of preferential trade agreements, we are now 
witnessing an approach where countries are willing to negotiate on both the regional and 
multilateral level. This approach will continue to be of importance to the global economic welfare. 
Therefore, it is important that the WTO continue to look at preferential trade agreements in 
greater detail and that there are strict forms and guidelines for preferential trade agreements.  One 
aspect which would improve the cooperation of multilateralism and regionalism would be if 
nation-states would report to the WTO their will to sign preferential trade agreements rather than 
waiting to report them when they are already signed. This would allow the WTO to have better 
control of the conditions at which preferential trade agreements are signed and would most likely 
help the countries which are pressured by economically stronger countries to sign agreements 
which may include features and aspects not as beneficial to the economically less powerful 
nation-states. Policy-makers in national governments must take into account both regionalism 
and multilateralism but at the same time they must also realize the fact that preferential trade 
agreements are currently having a greater role in the arena of international trade. In that sense, 
countries will continue to look for how preferential trade agreements can improve their economic 
well-being, but it is important that they do so while following the multilateral commitments 
which they have promised to abide by. 
Q: The amount of regional trade agreements between developing countries is on the rise (as 
indicated in figure 2). Can this be considered as a type of defensive reaction of the global south 
against the well-established bilateral and regional agreements in developed areas? And is this 
proof that multilateralism is on the decline?  
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A: I’m not sure that I would lump developed and developing countries into two separate groups. 
Yes it is true that most regional agreements were started by developed countries, but In fact 
developing countries have been signing their own agreements for a very long time. The oldest 
customs union is the Southern African Customs Union. It is a defensive reaction on a part of 
some countries, but it’s regardless of whether they are developing or developed countries. It’s 
simply a defensive reaction not to be left out of RTAs. For example, Japan did not want to sign 
RTAs for a long time and now they are beginning to sign RTAs. I would argue that countries 
started to sign regional trade agreements simply because their neighbours were doing it. In my 
opinion, multilateralism and regionalism will continue in a parallel fashion.  
Q: One can argue that bilateral and regional trade agreements between economically equally 
developed countries are mostly beneficial for both sides. However, the problem may be 
negotiations between developed and developing countries because very often the interests of the 
developed countries come out on top as the developing country has little choice but to 
subordinate to the demands of the developed country. How does the WTO regulate bilateral and 
regional trade negotiations, in particular those between developed and developing countries? 
A: We don’t. It is completely outside of the scope of the WTO to regulate these agreements. It is 
true that in some bilateral negotiations, a more powerful country is able to dictate the conditions 
to the less powerful country. 
Comment: The North-South agreements seem to be a major issue because there is a great 
asymmetry in economic power and also there is an asymmetry between the negotiating capacity 
of the countries. Therefore, it can be difficult to come to a balanced agreement. Addressing this 
problem from a legalistic approach may be a problem for the WTO, but they can provide capacity 
building for less powerful countries such as technical assistance, provide lectures or advisor 
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service. Finally however, this has to do more with negotiating strategy and tactical issues rather 
than the legal framework and legal capacity of the WTO. 
Q: Regionalism can also be witnessed in preferential-trade agreements between nation-states who 
are geographically located far from each other. This phenomenon contradicts with the argument 
that regional trade agreements are beneficial due to the geographical proximity of the countries 
involved and hence the low transportation costs. What is your opinion on regional trade 
agreements between nation-states separated by great distances? 
A: It’s an issue simply of market access. I’m not sure that the whole question of ‘I want to enter 
this market’ is often well though-out before the negotiations actually take place. In many cases it 
is a political decision taken on a very high level and taken on the basis of political friendship. 
For that reason, some agreements are terrible and therefore in general, regional trade 
agreements contradict with the most-favored nation principle. 
Comment: The negative aspect of preferential trade agreements is that it will create a disparity in 
the market access available to countries. In that sense, regardless of the distance aspect, the 
benefits are not distributed equally. However, even though regional and bilateral agreements 
contradict with the WTO’s most-favored nation principle, there is nothing to prevent countries 
from pursuing such agreements even with remote countries. Trade with neighboring countries can 
often be limited and that explains the desire of countries to seek market access in countries 
located geographically further. Furthermore, political incentives may also motivate or pressure 
countries to enter into preferential trade agreements with more powerful countries. 
Q: In your opinion, are regional and bilateral agreements a form of protectionism or rather a 
natural occurrence in the international trade arena? 
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A: I think to a large extent they are a natural occurence partly because there is a feeling among 
some countries that there is a stalemate in the WTO, that it is too difficult to negotiate with  a 
large amount of countries. And therefore, countries choose certain partners which may be more 
willing or think along the same lines as them 
Comment: In most cases one can argue that PTAs are not a form of protectionism but rather 
countries are looking for deeper economic integration in order to achieve economic gains. 
Q: Contradicting to the opinions of Bhagwati, Krueger and other economists, who are strongly 
opposed to regionalism and claim that “trading blocs can fragment world markets into exclusive 
and potentially hostile camps through unilateral protectionist policies (Michalak, 264)“, there are 
some scholars who claim that regionalism can promote negotiations on a multilateral level due to 
their great stability and political weight. How does the WTO feel about this? 
A: It is true that regional agreements divide the world into geographical islands where there is 
an agreement between a certain amount of countries which keep out others. But at the same time, 
if you look at modern RTAs, they include some of the issues which members are reluctant to 
include in the WTO negotiations. So in a sense, they are pushing the boundaries and they are 
pushing to include issues that affect trade but which certain members refuse to have included in 
the WTO.  
 
Section 2: Barriers to trade and the dispute settlement system 
Q: The WTO is an advocate of trade liberalization. How do you explain the use of barriers and 
interventions to free trade such as subsidies, import quotas or non-tariff barriers? What can be 
done to prevent these trade-distorting barriers? How much say do the end product consumers 
have? 
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A: Subsidies is a big issue that has held up the current round in 2008-2009. Subsidies are 
recognized as a big problem. There is the whole cotton issue which revolves around the use of 
subsidies by developed countries. The issue is how do you negotiate and agree to reduce those 
subsidies. Do you do it for developed countries only or do you do it for developing countries as 
well? It’s like an iceberg where the tip of the iceberg is the tariff barriers because that is 
something that consumers and exporters know they are paying for. Subsidies are more hidden 
because we don’t know how much subsidies certain countries provide, you don’t know what they 
provide them for and the impact of those subsidies. So it is a much more difficult issue to try to 
tackle. The consumers are not taken into account by most governments. Most governments tend 
to take their producers into account, not their consumers. 
Comment: One can witness that preferential trade agreements have been able to harmonize more 
behind-the-border measures such as product standards, rules and non-tariff barriers to trade and 
regulatory barriers. In that sense, regionalism has a great role to play in eliminating for example 
disparities in technological standards. On the other hand, the WTO has a greater role to play in 
the case of subsidies.  
Q: Selling a domestic product cheaper in foreign countries, also known as dumping or predatory 
pricing, is condemned under WTO principles. However, it is not forbidden. Why is such activity 
not forbidden completely? 
A: That is something that is up to the negotiations. There are mechanisms and rules that have 
been put in place to ensure that we all measure dumping in a uniform manner. All countries 
should use the same measure to calculate whether a product is being dumped or not. There also 
exist measures to try and deal with that dumping. 
Q: How do you feel about export subsidies? 
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A: Not particularly great as I don’t think that they should be used. Again, it is an issue that can 
only be dealt with at the multilateral level. In most RTAs, the parties agree to not use export 
subsidies. However, this is usually not effective and therefore has to be done at a global level. 
Q: What can be done to limit the amount of subsidies and not put producers outside of subsidized 
areas at a disadvantage? 
A: Well, it can be done on different levels. One is that the EU decides to limit its own subsidies. 
The second is that they agree internationally to reduce those subsidies or eliminate them 
altogether. To some extent, the EU is making an effort in a sense that its own budgetary 
constraints are requiring them to reform the CAP and reduce subsidies. And there are 
negotiations going on here as well to try and agree on limits on subsidies. The step that was 
taken in the Uruguay Round was the first step and it now needs to be taken further. 
D: In your opinion, in which ways is the agricultural sector different from the industrial and 
manufacturing sectors and what are the reasons for receiving so much attention from national 
governments? 
A: Well, it depends where you are. In a developing country it means that millions of people are 
actually attached to the land and their livelihood is based on producing a few crops. There I 
think the problem is much more critical because if you take that livelihood away from them then 
what can you give them in return and what can they actually do? Whereas in developed countries 
the issue is somewhat different because the level of poverty is not as high. In both developed and 
developing countries there is a great deal of abuse of the system as well. The use of subsidies is 
not something that is particularly efficient and regardless of whether it is different or not, 
agriculture is treated different because many people are attached to the land. However, because 
the number of people attached to agriculture is decreasing in developed countries, this decrease 
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should go hand in hand with reform of say the CAP or the subsidies that are provided by the US 
to its own farmers. However, there are also politics involved and there are strong lobbies and 
that is possibly one of the reasons why the reform does not take place or does not occur as fast as 
it should.  
Q: In regards to exports, developing and least developed countries rely most on their agricultural 
sector due to the fact that they are not as technologically or industrially advanced. On the other 
hand, WTO permits member states’ governments to grant subsidies only to agricultural sectors. 
Would you agree, that due to the developing countries’ greater dependence on the agricultural 
sector, large agricultural subsidies in developed countries represent a great hindrance to the 
trading capabilities of developing and least-developed countries? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What is your opinion on the legal power of the WTO in comparison to the legal sovereignty of 
individual nation-states?  
A: Well when one compares international law to national law, then international law has no 
teeth. Even when the Dispute Settlement Body passes a decision, it is up to the member state to 
enforce this decision. There is nothing the WTO can further do about it and therefore national 
law is sovereign. 
Q: Currently, out of 456 disputes which have been brought to the WTO since 1995, 143 cases are 
still in consultation. Out of these 143 cases, only 18 are less than three years old. How do you 
explain the large amount of cases which remain in consultation? What chances do these cases 
have of getting resolved?  
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A: The members are the ones that decide if they want to continue the consultations or take it a 
step further. There is no way the WTO can motivate the member states to move further with the 
consultations 
Comment: In the consultation process, there may be a political agreement that can be found. 
Promoting political agreements and mutually agreeable solutions and preventing retaliatory 
actions such as sanctions should be one merit of the WTO. 
 
Section 3: Doha Development Round 
Q: The Doha Development Round commenced in November 2001 and was seen as a potential 
remedy to the existing trade barriers around the world. Moreover, it focused greatly on bringing 
citizens of developing nations out of poverty. Nearly twelve years later, how would you define 
the success of the Doha Development?  
A: Not a success. Partially the reason is because the number of members has changed. 
Developing countries are a more important group and want to have a greater say than they have 
in the previous rounds. The issues are more complex and have changed over the past 10 years. 
The whole dynamic has changed because in the previous rounds there were fewer developing 
country members in the negotiations. 
Comment: Clearly, developed countries must now begin to keep in mind the power of developing 
countries, such as the BRIC countries, which have proved in the Doha Development Round that 
they can be very influential and strong negotiators. Once again, the WTO must play a greater role 
in advising both developed and developing countries on how to negotiate in order to come up 
with a conclusion to the Doha Development Round, which has been stalled for several years now 
and is making many countries pessimistic about multilateralism. 
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Q: Multinational corporations are powerful actors in the sphere of international trade. However, 
MNCs do not belong under any nation-states jurisdiction. Therefore, one may ask which sets of 
laws, rules or regulations should MNCs abide by? 
A: That’s upto their governments. Surely, MNCs have a home-base somewhere and they need to 
be regulated by the laws of their home nation-state. 
Q: Income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, is increasing in the majority of both 
developed and developing countries. Is this the sole responsibility of individual nation-states or 
does the WTO have a say on this issue? 
A: No, the WTO has no say on this issue. We can observe it, we can make recommendations but 
in the end we have no effect on changing the Gini coefficient. 
Q: Overall, how would you describe the current state of international trade? What can be done to 
decrease the regional movements and increase negotiations on a multilateral level? How do you 
feel about the idea of regional organizations cooperating on a multilateral level? 
A: The state of international trade at the moment is not particularly good. There is a shift 
towards developing countries, whose growth rate of exports is now larger than many countries of 
the developed world. The world economy is not doing very well, it is a question of business cycles 
and it is a question of the on-going economic crisis. The problem is that the WTO can make 
different recommendations but in the end it’s really the members that have to decide what to do. 
They are the ones involved in negotiating regional trade agreements, they are the ones that know 
that there is a problem in terms of the relationship between regional trade agreements and the 
multilateral trading system. There have been plenty of recommendations on how to reconcile the 
two systems. But in the end the problem is that members do not wish to negotiate on this issue. 
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Comment: In this answer, one can witness an example of how the WTO is using an innocent by-
stander approach. While it is true that it is upto the members to negotiate, decide and act on a 
various range of issues, one can argue that it is also upto the WTO to motivate members to 
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Chapter VII: Doha Development Round 
 
Prior to the current Doha Development Round, there were several rounds of multilateral 
negotiations. Figure 3 in the appendix portrays the history of multilateral trade talks and shows 
the length of each round, the name under which it was negotiated (the name originates either 
from the location at which the negotiations of the particular round were initiated or the political 
figure who was influential in initiating the talks), the subjects covered and the number of 
countries involved in the negotiations. One can notice a number of trends when analyzing the 
history of multilateral trade talks. Firstly, the length of the negotiations increased with each round. 
Each of the first five trade negotiation rounds did not take longer than 2 years and each covered 
only tariffs as the subject of the talks. One can assume that the relatively short length of these 
trade talks can be associated with the small number of countries involved. Moreover, the 
countries involved in the initial rounds were mostly only developed countries and this fact made 
it easier to negotiate together because there were no vast economic differences. Opposite from the 
Uruguay and Doha Round, there was not a group of countries which felt it should receive 
beneficial treatment. “At the same time developing countries placed more stock on the 
development potential of trade as many of them turned away from import substitution policies. 
As they did so, policy-makers in newly opened developing countries recognized the importance 
of participating in trade negotiations. As a result, in contrast to the Kennedy and Tokyo rounds, 
developing countries were actively involved in the discussions that led to the Uruguay Round: the 
large number of accessions or requests for accession to the GATT from such countries at that 
time (including Mexico and China) indicated that the issues on the table were being taken 
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seriously by a growing number of developing countries.38” The shift of the developing countries 
and their willingness to pursue multilateral trade talks represented a positive step in multilateral 
trade talks and brought a lot of hope and optimism to multilateralism itself.  
 When the Uruguay Round was being concluded, developing countries were promised 
large gains in welfare. Stiglitz states, “In 1992-3, the World Bank, the US Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, and various other institutions made projections of 
welfare gains on the order of US$ 200 billion a year.”39 Unfortunately, this has not been the case 
and most of the benefits of the Uruguay Round went to developed countries. Many of the 
interests of the developing countries, revolving around market access in agriculture and textiles, 
were not made a priority. Instead, the interests of developed countries were at the top of the 
agenda. Stiglitz continues, “Several reforms which were significant sources of predicated gains 
did not proceed as had been hoped early in the negotiations. For example, the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was structured to back-load liberalization significantly; the ability 
of tariff-rate quotes (TRQs) to liberalize agricultural market access was overestimated; and the 
costs of implementation were almost completely ignored.”40 Even though the Uruguay Round 
failed to fulfill the promises to developing, and more importantly least developed countries, it 
will be remembered as a great step forward in multilateral trade talks. The Uruguay Round taught 
the world that multilateral negotiations are a new culture in trade negotiations. While the 
promises were not completely fulfilled and the gains of the developing and least developed 
countries not realized, the Uruguay Round can be considered a success because it proved that 
                                                  
38 Stiglitz, 2005. Page 45. 
39 Stiglitz, 2005. Page 46 
40 Stiglitz, 2005. Page 47 
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multilateral trade talks with a large amount of countries ranging from developed to least 
developed countries is indeed possible. 
 The Doha Round commenced in November of 2001 and twelve years have passed and the 
world is yet to witness a conclusion to the round. Many of the developing countries, learning 
from their experiences in the Uruguay Round, are now stalling the negotiations. Instead, both 
developed and developing countries have signed preferential trade agreements with each other in 
order to provide their producers and consumers with market access. Whether the proliferation of 
preferential trade agreements is a by-product of the stalled talks at Doha or vise-versa is up for 
debate. Baldwin mentions three main reasons why the Doha negotiations have failed to reach a 
consensus. “The Doha negotiations have suffered from a number of consecutive failures to make 
advances. There is ample evidence that the combination of consensus rule, the member-driven 
nature of the organization and the single-undertaking approach for trade negotiations have 
contributed to this situation.”41 The consensus rule refers to general agreement of opinions, where 
one member of the WTO has the ability to stall talks if it does not agree with the given conditions. 
This consensus rule is criticized by Baldwin as ineffective: “Although Article IX WTO 
Agreement provides for majority voting if a consensus is not reached (with decisions to be 
adopted open a simple majority of the votes cast), such voting does not take place. The current 
consensus practice is ineffective because it risks cementing the status quo. From a 
constitutionalist perspective, it is even more important that this practice is also illegitimate.”42 
Naturally, there are two sides of the argument when it comes to the decision-making process of 
the WTO. Some argue that having a consensus among all of the members provides the decision 
                                                  
41 The Prospects of International Trade Regulation, 2011. Page 108 
42 The Prospects of International Trade Regulation, 2011. Page 96 
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on the particular topic ultimate legitimacy and ensures that no member is left out of the decision-
making process. Others, on the other hand, argue that this form of decision-making with 153 
members has stalled the Doha Round and that there is an urgent need for reform of the decision-
making process of the WTO. In order to get a better understanding of why the Doha negotiations 
have stalled, the next few paragraphs will observe the decision-making process. 
 A vital part of the decision-making process is the single-undertaking principle. Paragraph 
47 of the WTO Ministerial Declaration adopted on November 14, 2001, at the commencement of 
the Doha negotiations states: “With the exception of the improvements and clarifications of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, the conduct, conclusion and entry into force of the outcome of 
the negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking. However, agreements reached at 
an early stage may be implemented on a provisional or a definitive basis. Early agreements shall 
be taken into account in assessing the overall balance of the negotiations.“43 The single-
undertaking principle means that each topic must be agreed to separately, but at the same time the 
entire package is not agreed to until all separate topics are agreed to. This principle ensures that 
the entire package is accepted by all the members and that there is a sufficient amount of 
bargaining on the various topics involved in a larger topic. Clearly, the challenging aspect of the 
single-undertaking principle is that due to the large amount of members involved and the great 
differences in their cultures, there are naturally differences in views, opinions and approaches to 
negotiations. 
 Baldwin also refers to the member-driven nature of the WTO. What Baldwin is refering to 
is what has been confirmed in the interview with Rohini Acharya from the Trade Policy Review 
Division of the WTO. In many of her answers, Ms. Acharya declared that the responsibility falls 
                                                  
43 WTO.org, 13 Apr 2013. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#organization 
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to the members of the WTO and that the WTO does not have the capabalities to decide for its 
members. Many scholars have referred to this standpoint as the ‘innocent by-stander‘ approach 
used by the WTO. Granted, the members are the most vital component. However, one can argue 
that there should be more of a push from the WTO itself to motivate its members to come to 
conclusions, especially in a time when the Doha Round is at a stalemate and has been the longest 
round in WTO/GATT history. One can propose an increase in advisory boards consisting of 
neutral experts which would advise both developed and developing countries, on an individual 
basis, how to bargain with other members of the WTO. Such an investment may speed up the 
decision-making process and may push the negotiations further.  
 Yet another reason why the Doha Round has been stalled refers to the aspect of 
corporations and firms lobbying their business interests to their respective governments. The 
business interests of corporations may consequently affect negotiations on an international level. 
Prior to describing the role of lobbying corporations, Baldwin mentions other popular reasons 
why the Doha Round negotiations have been stalled: “The lack of leadership, domestic politics, 
conflicting views on development concerns, as well as the aforementioned characteristics of 
legislative decision-making in the WTO, have been proposed as explanations for the standstill in 
the current multilateral trade negotiations.“44 Domestic politics is arguably one of the main 
reasons for the stalled negotiations because refers to a member pursuing its own national political 
and economic interest by negotiating only with a few selected members in a regional or bilateral 
trade agreement. As previously described, the great proliferation of preferential trade agreements 
can be appointed to domestic policy of individual nation-states and their eagerness to open some 
of its markets and provide their producers and consumers with access to additional markets. 
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Furthermore, a chain reaction can be observed, as one can assume that other nation-states 
continue to seek bilateral and regional agreements because they want to remain competitive in the 
international trade arena. Firms and corporations may not be willing to bargain or give up their 
powerful positions because they are mainly driven by their main interests: beneficial profit 
margins, large turnovers and high revenues. Baldwin continues, “The balance of corporate trade 
policy interests at the domestic level is thus important since it shapes the politically feasible 
negotiation solutions at the international level.“45 It is clear that corporate interests are reflected 
in members‘ international trade negotiations and attention must be paid to the various interests 
and posititions across various industries and countries. Moreover, companies are pushing national 
governments through their lobbyists to sign regional and bilateral trade agreements because of the 
complex process involved in the production of products required for the production of further 
products. Given that there are several stages of productions, often occurring in different countries, 
firms are looking for a decrease in tariffs along the different stages. Furthermore, firms do not 
have the patience to wait for years before multilateral negotiations are completed, explaining the 
proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements over the past few years. One can consider 
this topic very sensitive because of the lack of transparency between the range of influence which 
domestic corporations may have on the politics of WTO members and on the negotiation tactics 
of WTO members in international trade negotiations. 
 The Doha Development Round has proved to be a disappointment to multilateralism and 
multilateral trade negotiations. While there may be secondary reasons for the stallmate of the 
Doha Development Round, many of them beyond the scope of this research, the main 
responsibility falls to the members. As the interview with a WTO representative confirmed, the 
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WTO consists purely of its members and therefore any success or failure can be ascribed directly 
to them. Nevertheless, it also remains the responsibility of the WTO to motivate its members to 
speeden multilateral negotiations. The following chapter will outline the various possible forms 
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Chapter VIII: Non-tariff Barriers to Trade 
  
Unlike tariffs, nontariff barriers to trade are extremely difficult to measure because of the 
great variety of such barriers and also because of their non-economic nature. “Nontariff barriers 
(NTBs) are limits on trade other than tariffs, including quotas, regulations and technical 
requirements. While many countries claim to embrace free trade, most continue to use a variety 
of nontariff barriers to restrict the entry of imported goods and services.”46 Often, many of the 
non-tariff barriers to trade are implemented in a manner where the particular country seeking to 
protect its domestic industries from foreign competition cannot be accused of trade-distorting 
measures. As confirmed in the interview with a representative of the WTO, non-tariff barriers to 
trade represent a great problem in the regulation of trade and are very difficult for the WTO to 
control.  
 In order to get a better understanding of the wide range of nontariff barriers to trade, 
various forms of such measures will be outlined. The first two types of measures include 
measures that are applied when the product is either imported or exported across the country’s 
border. “A first category of NTMs are those imposed on imports. This category includes import 
quotas, import prohibitions, import licensing, and customs procedures and administration fees.“47 
This category mainly refers to the stage where a particular good or service is crossing the border 
and some further examples can include obstructions by border controls, unneccesary customs 
surcharges or issues related to the rules of origin. “A second category of NTMs are those imposed 
on exports. These include export taxes, export subsidies, export quotas, export prohibitions, and 
                                                  
46 Folsom, David. Encyclopedia of American Business. 2004. Page. 331. 
47 Staiger. 2011. Page 2. 
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voluntary export restraints.“48 The amount of nontariff measures imposed on exports is not as 
great as the amount of nontariff measures imposed on imports because the trend is that 
governments are favouring exports, while looking to protect their domestic industries. “ A third 
and final category of NTMs are those imposed internally in the domestic economy. Such behind-
the-border measures include domestic legislation covering 
health/technical/product/labor/environmental standards, internal taxes or charges, and domestic 
subsidies.“49 One can argue that the final category is the least transparent due to highly technical 
terms and measures used in the various standards applied to various products or services. These 
standards are often met by domestic producers, but are more difficult to fulfill for foreign 
producers. This trend can be attributed to the various differences in countries’ technological 
advances, access to capital and access to education and R&D (research and development).  
 Yet another type of non-tariff barriers is safeguards. Safeguards refer to restraints to 
certain imports with the intention to protect the domestic industry. “The Agreement on 
Safeguards clarifies and reinforces Article XIX. It sets forth criteria for the application of 
safeguard measures: (I) the product is being imported in increased quantities, absolutely or 
relative to domestic production; (2) the product causes or threatens to cause serious injury to 
domestic industry; and (3) the safeguard measure shall only be applied to the extent necessary to 
prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment.“ 50 Stiglitz continues by criticizing 
the United States for its overuse of safeguard measures to protect domestic producers. “If the 
richest country in the world, the United States, with a strong safety net, relatively high 
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49 Staiger. 2011. Page 2. 
50 Stiglitz. 2005. Page 128. 
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employment level, etc. has to resort to safeguard measures to protect itself against a surge of 
imports, how much more justified are developing countries in imposing such measures. This 
highlights again the need to set clearer standards at the international level.“51 Safeguard measures 
are clearly trade-distorting measures because they put producers in foreign countries at a 
disadvantage by preventing them from exporting to a particular country. It is important that the 
WTO motivates its members to apply identical standards regarding the implementation of not 
only safeguards, but other non-tariff trade barriers. Unfortunately, the use of nontariff barriers has 
increased over time, indirectly questioning the successes of multilateral agreements on tariff 
reductions. 
The greatest challenge for the WTO and its members is to distinguish which of the 
nontariff measures are acceptable and which are unnecessary. In other words, it is challenging to 
determine the true purpose of the various measures. Either, the measures have a legitimate 
purpose or the purpose is to prevent further imports. “All this makes the issues that arise in 
connection with determining the economic impact of NTBs very different from those surrounding 
the use of tariffs. As far as trade and the economic impact of NTBs are concerned, much depends 
on the specific circumstances of their application. To understand the effect of a specific measure 
requires a case-by-case examination.“52 The challenges of nontariff barriers to trade will continue 
to be challenging for the WTO and for its members; both in the sense of measuring them as well 
minimizing them and the associated trade-distorting effects. Nontariff barriers will remain one of 
the most challenging aspects in the regulation of trade in decades to come. One can argue that 
analyzing policies, which could be classified as nontariff barriers to trade on a case-by-case basis, 
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would require a great amount of resources. With that being said, one can conclude that it is the 
individual governments which must play a responsible and active role in decreasing nontariff 
barriers to trade. Moreover, cooperation, communication and trust between individual nation-
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Chapter IX: Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, the reasons for preferential trade agreements are clear. Nation-states, 
regardless of their economic power, are pushed by firms and companies through lobbying to 
pursue bilateral and regional trade agreements, in many cases providing tariff-free trading 
conditions and benefiting local producers and exporters. The multilateral negotiations in the 
WTO, on the other hand, are ‘only’ decreasing tariffs by a relatively small amount and the Doha 
Development Round is not coming closer to any real multilateral agreement. Moreover, 
preferential trade agreements, whether in the form of regionalism or bilateralism, very often 
include further issues such as services, product standards, financial investment or environmental 
issues. Most of these issues are, at least for the time being, being avoided in multilateral 
negotiations due to the increased complexity of negotiations between the great amount of nation-
states involved. Being able to negotiate on issues such as trade in services or attracting 
investment is a great motivation of nation-states to sign preferential trade agreements. The desire 
to go deeper and broader in terms of liberalization is clearly the main motivation for nation-states. 
Furthermore, as proven by the stalemate in Doha Development Round, preferential trade 
agreements are concluded more smoothly and swiftly in comparison to multilateral trade 
agreements and this is proving to be yet another motivator for nation-states to pursue bilateral and 
regional trade agreements in order to remain competitive and provide its producers and exporters 
with increased market access.  
 The proliferation of preferential trade agreements since the mid 1990s has provided 
further challenges to the WTO and to the concept of multilateralism. Moreover, the ‘spaghetti-
bowl’ effect of the vast amount of PTAs has created a very complex international trade arena, 
where trade routes are overlapping. “Further, it must be borne in mind that the large number of 
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overlapping trade agreements (the ‘spaghetti-bowl phenomenon’) raises the transaction costs of 
global trade and has the effect of ‘sand in the wheels’. This outcome is considerably reinforced 
by complicated rules of origin.”53 The WTO has, for both developed and developing countries, 
become a secondary priority subordinated to the demands of attractive trading partners.  
Even though the WTO has adapted the role of an ‘innocent by-stander’ that can only 
provide its members with the negotiating forum and a dispute settlement mechanism (the Dispute 
Settlement Body), one can argue that the WTO still has a great role to play despite the 
proliferation of PTAs. Raising the awareness is one of the first steps. The Warwick Commission 
Report on Trade states: “In the months and years ahead it will be important to remind trade and 
development policymakers, civil society, and the media where the WTO’s obligations really lie 
and why others, including the aid ministries of national governments and the providers of 
technical assistance, should not fail in their trade-related aid commitments to developing 
countries.“54 Besides raising awareness of the positive and negative impacts of the great 
proliferation of PTAs, further roles of the WTO include guiding its members to pursue ‘fair’ 
negotiations and to achieve them in a ‘fair’ manner, providing guidelines and rules for the signing 
of preferential trade agreements to ensure that the agreements do not conflict with the principles 
of the WTO, helping nation-states solve disputes regarding rules of origin disputes, and to 
continue fighting against non-tariff trade barriers in the form of technical standard restrictions, 
subsidies and dumping.  
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On the other hand, all members of the WTO must realize that their responsibilities as 
sovereign nation-states reach beyond domestic interests. Their responsibilities as sovereign 
countries also reach to multilateralism. While pursuing their own national interests, nation-states 
must provide the WTO with legitimacy to guide and control preferential trade agreements. One 
step towards this goal would be reporting the PTA and its conditions prior to its signing. As 
confirmed by Rohini Acharya, the Chief of section of the Regional Trade Agreement Section in 
the Trade Policies Review Division of the WTO, there is not much the WTO can do about the 
conditions at which PTAs are signed because they are reported after the negotiators have already 
signed the agreement. Reporting PTAs and the conditions at which they are agreed prior to the 
actual signing would greatly increase the transparency of the entire process and would be a great 
step towards multilateralizing PTAs. 
As discussed in earlier sections, there is a great amount of actors involved and affected by 
the regulation of international trade, which the regulation of international trade even more 
challenging. The range of interests and opinions of individual member-states, groups of nation-
states entering into preferential trade agreements, intergovernmental organisations, non-
governmental organisations, multilateral organisations such as the WTO or the United Nations, 
producers and exporters, multinational corporations and the end-product consumers collide, 
intertwine and further increase the complexity of the topic at hand. The conditions at which 
international trade agreements are signed also have an effect on a great amount of issues ranging 
from food security and poverty issues to political and economic issues at all levels: individual, 
local, domestic, national and global. In the same way that our individual decisions as consumers 
affect negotiations on an international level, negotiations between nation-states have a major 
effect on the well-being of individuals across the world. These effects are greatly emphasized in 
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least developed countries struggling with critical issues such as poverty, famine and very low 
living standards. Such concerns should motivate leaders in both developed and developing 
countries to negotiate and pursue agreements, which would not only satisfy the demands of 
lobbyists of corporations and the demands of national interests, but also the needs of ordinary 
citizens and producers. Issues of poverty and the growing inequality between the worlds’ richest 
and poorest citizens must be considered one of the priorities in the sphere of international trade. 
When the GATT was founded, the purposes of such a multilateral agreement were not 
purely economical. One can argue that the reasons behind the formation of the GATT in 1948 
were also to provide political stability in international relations. Unfortunately, the impact of 
trade agreements on both political issues as well as human rights issues seems to have been 
ignored. “Separate in their legal development in the twentieth century, human rights and trade 
regimes are, however, as offspring of an international post-world war order, both instruments of 
the same overall global interest, which is to promote peace and human welfare.“55 Discrimination, 
in the form of preferential trade agreements, has a negative impact of political stability between 
nation-states and can further hinder negotiations on issues related to, for example, the 
environment or human rights.  
Firstly, as one can easily argue that preferential trade agreements will continue to be 
present in years to come, regardless of the successes or failures of future multilateral talks, it is 
important for nation-states to abide by identical rules and guidelines related to signing regional 
and bilateral trade agreements. Secondly, the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO will 
have a great role to play in years to come as many of the recently signed trade agreements are 
gradually getting implemented. Furthermore, the WTO should provide its members with 
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counseling and advice on how to negotiate and bargain with each other in order to overcome the 
many economic, political and cultural differences. One can also argue that preferential trade 
agreements in the form of bilateral and regional trade agreements should be negotiated under 
WTO supervision. While it may seem unlikely, it would greatly improve the level of 
transparency of PTAs and provide further stability on the multilateral level. 
While the WTO negotiations have been successful in decreasing tariffs on a global level, 
there has been considerably less success with decreasing subsidies and non-tariff trade barriers. 
Subsidies are a great hindrance to international trade because they provide artificial advantage to 
the producers of the subsidized sector and at the same time put producers in other countries, 
which would normally have comparative advantage in the production of the given product, at a 
disadvantage.  Therefore, subsidies can be considered as trade-distorting measures and also as 
economically inefficient. Non-tariff trade barriers are very difficult to measure and include 
technical barriers to trade, countervailing measures, dumping and anti-dumping measures. “In 
summary the agenda for the ‘Development Round‘ has evolved disappointingly for developing 
countries since Doha. It has done little to address their concerns in agriculture and it has done 
little to address problems posed by non-tariff barriers.“56 Non-tariff barriers and many behind-
the-border protectionist measures will continue to pose a threat in years to come because of their 
invisibility. Thefore, minimizing and eliminating such trade-distorting measures must continue to 
be a priority for nation-states in both bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations.  
An important part of the research is also to conclude whether the initial hypothesis were 
proved or disproved. Hypothesis #1 states “ Free trade has a positive impact on the economic 
welfare of both developed and developing countries.“ This hypothesis has been both proved and 
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disproved as it depends on many factors which have been discussed in previous chapters. In 
theory, free trade is welfare enhancing to both developed and developing countries. In practice, 
however, it may occurr that developed countries are able to politically pressure developing or 
least developed countries into signing agreements which may be more beneficial to the developed 
countries. Nevertheless, as confirmed by the interview with the WTO, the negotiating power of 
developing countries such as the BRICs is swiftly increasing. Trade should be benefecial to all 
trading partners involved, regardless of whether the agreement at hand is a bilateral, regional or 
multilateral trade agreement. The guidelines relating to the procedure and the conditions at which 
trade agreements are signed and implemented must be strict, clear and identical for all WTO 
members. 
The second hypothesis states: “Regional trading blocs are a form of protectionist policies 
and therefore put states outside of the region at a disadvantage.” This hypothesis has been clearly 
disproved. The proliferation of preferential trade agreements in the form of bilateral and regional 
trade agreements has been, to a great extent, a result of the stalemate on the multilateral level. 
Countries are seeking to provide their producers and exporters with greater market access and 
therefore look to sign PTAs with both neighbouring and distant countries. Countries previously 
not involved eventually seek their own trading partners in order to remain competitive in the 
international trade arena. In theory, as preferential trade agreements are also a form of trade 
liberalization, it is difficult to argue that they are a form of protectionist policies. 
The third hypothesis states: “ Regional trading blocs consisting of developed and 
developing countries often put developing countries at a disadvantage.“ While many scholars 
would argue that least developed countries are often pressured to sign agreements at conditions 
which are more favourable to the developed countries with more bargaining power, it can be 
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argued that some of the major developing countries are becoming more and more powerful in 
trade negotiations. The role of some of the major developing countries has increased greatly and 
therefore it can be stated that the third hypothesis has been disproved. Nevertheless, some 
developing and least developed countries and their producers and exporters may consider 
themselves at a disadvantage in contrast to developed countries. Therefore, the WTO and the 
UNCTAD must continue to help the smaller developing countries and the least developed 
countries by advicing them when negotiating bilateral or regional trade agreements with more 
economically and politically powerful countries.  
One can conclude that the current state of international trade is not ideal. Multilateral 
negotiations are not making great advances and the Doha Development Round has been caught in 
a deadlock for several years now. Regionalism, on the other hand, is growing greatly as the 
number of preferential trade agreements in the form of bilateral or regional trade agreements has 
greatly increased in the past decade. This phenomenon has attracted the attention of many 
scholars who have analyzed the effects of preferential trade agreements on countries not involved 
in the agreements. Moreover, it must be further pointed out that many countries are pressured into 
accepting unfavourable trading conditions with economically stronger countries due to lobbying 
or other political reasons. The differences in economic power and negotiating power are more 
visible in bilateral trade agreements because the smaller nation-states are often facing more 
powerful states on their own. In multilateral negotiations, on the other hand, developing and least 
developed countries with similar interests can stick together and create alliances. Hence, one can 
assume that multilateral trade negotiations are more likely to help least-developed countries and 
developing countries while preferential trade agreements are more likely to help developed 
countries.  
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On the other hand, there are also reasons for an optimistic outlook. The recent increase in 
the amount, the level of integration and the importance of regional trading blocs, can make 
negotiations on a multilateral level easier and smoother. One can assume that negotiations 
between a smaller amount of members, consisting of groups of countries, can be considered more 
likely to achieve positive results rather than negotiations between a large amount of individual 
nation-states. This assumption will be confirmed or refuted in years to come. While the issues 
related to international trade are vast and complex, this research paper has attempted to introduce 
the reader with the most important challenges of international trade regulation and with the issues 















This thesis is an empirical research on the impact that preferential trade agreements have on the 
welfare of individuals and nation-states. As the number of preferential trade agreements has been 
growing steadily, the on-going clash between regionalism and multilateralism will be a key topic 
throughout the research. Fair trade movements have been becoming more popular over the fast 
few years as some organizations have strived to raise consumers’ awareness regarding the great 
disparities among the profit margins of the producers or farmers in developing countries in 
comparison to those of the merchants and distributors in developed countries. Even though 
quantitative data will be used in order to portray the growing economic inequalities present in 
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